LIVE_FEED
--:--:--[HIGH]shop-***-deals.comMagecart skimmer (Group 7)// US-EAST--:--:--[HIGH]wp-***-blog.netDrive-by iframe → exploit kit// EU-WEST--:--:--[MEDIUM]cdn-***-helper.ioObfuscated cryptominer (CoinIMP)// AP-SOUTH--:--:--[HIGH]auth-***-login.coCredential phishing kit (16shop)// EU-CENTRAL--:--:--[MEDIUM]media-***-files.orgMalicious redirect chain → ClickFix// US-WEST--:--:--[HIGH]support-***-desk.comFakeUpdates / SocGholish payload// US-EAST--:--:--[LOW]track-***-pixel.appUnauthorized 3rd-party tracker// EU-NORTH--:--:--[MEDIUM]img-***-host.ruDrive-by download (TLD reputation)// EU-EAST--:--:--[HIGH]api-***-stats.xyzC2 beacon (Cobalt Strike profile)// AP-EAST--:--:--[LOW]promo-***-coupon.shopAffiliate cloaking + cookie stuff// US-CENTRAL--:--:--[HIGH]shop-***-deals.comMagecart skimmer (Group 7)// US-EAST--:--:--[HIGH]wp-***-blog.netDrive-by iframe → exploit kit// EU-WEST--:--:--[MEDIUM]cdn-***-helper.ioObfuscated cryptominer (CoinIMP)// AP-SOUTH--:--:--[HIGH]auth-***-login.coCredential phishing kit (16shop)// EU-CENTRAL--:--:--[MEDIUM]media-***-files.orgMalicious redirect chain → ClickFix// US-WEST--:--:--[HIGH]support-***-desk.comFakeUpdates / SocGholish payload// US-EAST--:--:--[LOW]track-***-pixel.appUnauthorized 3rd-party tracker// EU-NORTH--:--:--[MEDIUM]img-***-host.ruDrive-by download (TLD reputation)// EU-EAST--:--:--[HIGH]api-***-stats.xyzC2 beacon (Cobalt Strike profile)// AP-EAST--:--:--[LOW]promo-***-coupon.shopAffiliate cloaking + cookie stuff// US-CENTRAL
threat glossary

Service Worker Abuse

Using a service worker to host a persistent skimmer or malware that survives page reloads and is invisible to passive scanners.

What it is

A service worker is a script the browser runs in the background, separate from the page, and able to intercept network requests. Attackers register a malicious service worker (often via an innocuous-looking analytics.js wrapper) to keep a skimmer active across navigations and reloads. Because the code lives outside the page's DOM, static scanners and signature matching typically miss it.

Real-world examples

  • A payment-page skimmer registered inside a service worker.
  • Fetch interception for silent form-data exfiltration.
  • A persistent payload activated only after a fingerprint check.

How ExploitShield detects it

ExploitShield's crawler launches a fully instrumented Chromium with service-worker hooks, runs a synthetic checkout, and records every fetch initiator in the resulting page tree — capturing the payload exactly when it fires for a realistic-looking session.

Related terms