LIVE_FEED
--:--:--[HIGH]shop-***-deals.com→Magecart skimmer (Group 7)// US-EAST--:--:--[HIGH]wp-***-blog.net→Drive-by iframe → exploit kit// EU-WEST--:--:--[MEDIUM]cdn-***-helper.io→Obfuscated cryptominer (CoinIMP)// AP-SOUTH--:--:--[HIGH]auth-***-login.co→Credential phishing kit (16shop)// EU-CENTRAL--:--:--[MEDIUM]media-***-files.org→Malicious redirect chain → ClickFix// US-WEST--:--:--[HIGH]support-***-desk.com→FakeUpdates / SocGholish payload// US-EAST--:--:--[LOW]track-***-pixel.app→Unauthorized 3rd-party tracker// EU-NORTH--:--:--[MEDIUM]img-***-host.ru→Drive-by download (TLD reputation)// EU-EAST--:--:--[HIGH]api-***-stats.xyz→C2 beacon (Cobalt Strike profile)// AP-EAST--:--:--[LOW]promo-***-coupon.shop→Affiliate cloaking + cookie stuff// US-CENTRAL--:--:--[HIGH]shop-***-deals.com→Magecart skimmer (Group 7)// US-EAST--:--:--[HIGH]wp-***-blog.net→Drive-by iframe → exploit kit// EU-WEST--:--:--[MEDIUM]cdn-***-helper.io→Obfuscated cryptominer (CoinIMP)// AP-SOUTH--:--:--[HIGH]auth-***-login.co→Credential phishing kit (16shop)// EU-CENTRAL--:--:--[MEDIUM]media-***-files.org→Malicious redirect chain → ClickFix// US-WEST--:--:--[HIGH]support-***-desk.com→FakeUpdates / SocGholish payload// US-EAST--:--:--[LOW]track-***-pixel.app→Unauthorized 3rd-party tracker// EU-NORTH--:--:--[MEDIUM]img-***-host.ru→Drive-by download (TLD reputation)// EU-EAST--:--:--[HIGH]api-***-stats.xyz→C2 beacon (Cobalt Strike profile)// AP-EAST--:--:--[LOW]promo-***-coupon.shop→Affiliate cloaking + cookie stuff// US-CENTRAL
threat glossary

Magecart

A broad umbrella for dozens of groups running JavaScript card-data theft campaigns on e-commerce payment pages.

What it is

Magecart is not a single group but a label applied to multiple web-skimming campaigns. Attackers inject obfuscated JavaScript into the checkout flow of a target site — often via a compromised external dependency such as an analytics tool, A/B testing widget, or chat widget — and exfiltrate card data to attacker-controlled domains. Variants include script-tag injection, service-worker compromise, and skimmers hiding payloads in PNG steganography.

Real-world examples

  • British Airways (2018) — skimmer loaded from a compromised build of modernizr.js.
  • Newegg (2018) — a single inline script added to the payment page.
  • Inter skimmer kit — observed across dozens of separate campaigns in 2024–2025.

How ExploitShield detects it

ExploitShield detects Magecart by re-rendering every monitored page in a real browser every 5 minutes, capturing every executed JS body, and comparing external POST destinations against 500+ blocklists and skimmer-endpoint heuristics.

Related terms